Civil Disobedience, Punishment, and Injustice

This chapter examines the tension between the justification and the punishment of civil disobedience, and theorists’ common solutions to it, by focusing on two central questions: first, should the state punish civil disobedience? Second, should the civil disobedient accept punishment? It presents the theoretical lay of the land on each of these questions, with particular attention to American jurisprudence on civil disobedience. The third part takes a step back to ask anew, how should we think about civil disobedience? and uncovers some problematic assumptions behind the common theoretical approach to the “problem” of civil disobedience.

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Notes

Agents ought to act nonviolently and openly and present their civil disobedience as an appeal to the foundational principles of consent, freedom of association, and the right to dissent (see Smith 2010).

To say that the right against punishment is presumptive is to recognize that there may be weighty countervailing reasons to punish or penalize civil disobedience. However, Brownlee contends that even when judges are justified to punish civil disobedients, they ought to apologize to the latter for infringing upon their rights.

A Plowshares case illustrates the state’s rigid stance and what’s at stake when civil disobedients fail to satisfy some of the non-evasion requirements identified above. Four anti-nuclearPlowshares defendants who insisted on explaining why they had trespassed a Johns Hopkins University research facility were found in contempt and removed from the courtroom. Daniel Berrigan shouted from the audience, “Let them speak, judge” and later added, “This court is a disgrace.” The judge demanded an apology and Berrigan defiantly replied, “I will change my position when you allow people in this court… to explain their actions.” Vaughn responded by holding Berrigan in contempt and sentenced him to five years in prison. See Buckley (1992).

Brownlee (2012) draws a distinction between conscience and conviction, which explains her change of terminology. “Conscience,” in her view, consists of “a set of practical moral skills that stem from an inward knowledge of the working of our own mind and heart,” while “conviction” refers to serious and sincere, though possibly mistaken, belief in a moral norm (Brownlee 2012, p. 52).

A portion of these protesters was part of a black block that smashed some windows. I could summon many references here, but Anderson (2016) fits particularly well.

I am grateful to Chris Bennett, Koshka Duff, Ben Ewing, Kimberly Ferzan, Thomas Fossen, Robert Jubb, David Lyons, Andrei Poama, William Smith, and Aart Van Gils for their valuable feedback on earlier drafts.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA Candice Delmas
  1. Candice Delmas